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Darya Kraynaya 
Honors Thesis 
December 22, 2006 
Burundian Refugees and Perpetuation of   
Instability in the Great Lakes Region 
For over a decade Burundi has faced internal conflict between the Tutsi and the 
Hutu. The Republic of Burundi received its independence on July 1, 1962 and three years 
later, the Prime Minister was assassinated. The assassination of Pierre Ngendandumwe, 
the Hutu Prime Minister, led to an outbreak of a chain of revolts by the Hutu. The 
conflict between the Hutu and the Tutsi in Burundi became more serious after the tragic 
events of Rwanda in 1994. (Situation Report: Burundi) The future of Burundi depends on 
the progress of possible reconciliation between the warring Hutu and Tutsi and of course 
the outlawed militant groups. The progress of reconciliation is essential because, 
although a ceasefire agreement was reached in May 2005, between the extremist Hutu 
group, Palipehutu-FNL ("FNL”) and the government of Burundi, the fighting still 
continues. It is of utmost importance to analyze this long conflict because not only has it 
resulted in great numbers of refugees seeking asylum outside of their home country, and 
internally displaced persons (IDPs), but also it has greatly impeded the development of 
Burundi as an independent state and has had negative effects on the neighboring states. 
Tanzania has been particularly affected because it has been hosting large numbers of 
Burundian refugees for several years. In 1996, approximately 100,000 were “relocated by 
force into special camps.” (Cohen and Deng, 15). Although the exact number of 
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Burundian refugees is unknown, according to United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), 
 There are now more than 4,000 Burundian asylum seekers 
in three way stations in the district of Kibondo, in north-
western Tanzania. Some 3,500 Burundians have crossed 
the border since the start of the year and the numbers keep 
growing at an average rate of 100 new arrivals a day 
(Growing Number of Burundians Flee to Neighbouring 
Tanzania). 
The conflict in Burundi has perpetuated and prolonged the instability of the Great Lakes 
Region and even today, the number of Burundian refugees coming to Tanzania continues 
growing. 
 The refugee situation in the Great Lakes region is  undeniably a crisis. 
Undoubtedly, when thousands of innocent people, civilians are dying at the hand of those 
whom they have been living side by side with for many years, it is a crisis. Additionally, 
the number of refugees is increasing and borders between Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania 
are practically open, which in turn creates a serious security issue. This crisis not only 
affects Burundi, but every state in the Great Lakes region. Furthermore, the conflict in 
Burundi and the refugee crisis is humanitarian, diplomatical/political, and of course has 
affected national and international security.  
 The parallel between the events in Burundi and Rwanda is clear, and the problem 
seems even identical. Adrien Ntabona, secretary general of the Conference of Catholic 
Bishops in Burundi stresses that the tensions between the Hutu and the Tutsi were shaped 
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by the Belgian colonization. The colonizers favored one of the ethnic groups, Tutsi, 
which in turn provided to the ethnic group more resources, such as education, 
employment and power of rule. The Tutsi originally were the “favorites” because they 
had lighter skin and appeared more European, which certainly pleased the Belgian 
colonizers. However, it is important to note that in the 1930’s when ethnic identity cards 
were introduced, Burundian citizens were not sure how to identify themselves due to 
numerous cases of intermarriage between the Hutu and the Tutsi. Therefore, the Belgians 
decided that “those men with ten or more cattle were declared Tutsi and those with less 
than ten were declared Hutu” (Janzen and Janzen, 176).  While this fact may appear 
insignificant, it is in fact, crucial because it shows that it was, in fact colonization, 
particularly the Belgian colonization of Burundi, that broke the “balance of clanship and 
occupational groups [because the Belgian] government sought to rule through the 
established elite” (Janzen and Janzen, 176).  
Following Pierre Ngendandumwe’s assassination in 1965, the Tutsi controlled 
government has actively suppressed the Hutu opposition. Needless to say, the means of 
solving the “problem”--the perpetual conflict between the Tutsis and Hutu, were very 
violent while at the same time strategic. As stated in Burundi: Genocide and Transition: 
Tutsis discrimination against Hutu was most keenly felt in 
two ways: denial of educational opportunities, which meant 
that most government positions (which required education 
and other skills) were filled by Tutsis; and, by means of a 
strange ‘girth by height’ requirement, blockage of Hutu 
entry into the armed forces.  (1-2) 
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Because the Tutsis controlled the armed forces, they were able to  utilize the means 
available to them to “perform acts of genocide on the Hutus” (Burundi: Genocide and 
Transition). Primarily they justify the use of the security forces as prevention against 
protests. However, it is clear that they utilized security forces to ensure the suppression of 
the Hutu voice in society, economy, and politics.  
 Another outbreak of violence, in 1972, according to Warren Weinstein and Robert 
Schrire “resulted from a discrepancy between the reality of inequality and ethnic 
privilege.” (21) Although government leaders denied that the Tutsi received preferential 
treatment, in fact the Tutsi enjoyed “economic and political benefits.” (22) Burundi had a 
growing population, but not enough soil to be distributed equally between all citizens, 
thus competition for land possession intensified and created more tension between the 
Hutu and the Tutsi.  
 In 1990, the conflict between the Hutu and the security forces controlled by the 
Tutsis resulted in 3,000 deaths. The conflict has escalated throughout the years, every 
year bringing more casualties, civilian as well as those of the security forces and the 
military. One of the particularly hot points in the history of the conflict arrived in 
November 1998. At that point, large numbers of refugees have been sent to “regroupment 
sites” where they were treated inhumanely by the security guards, and had no access to 
basic resources such as clean water and humanitarian aid. It is quite disturbing that while 
the international community, UNHCR and the Human Rights Watch were condemning 
the treatment of Burundi refugees by the host countries, the same was happening on the 
Burundi territory where conflict had been brewing for several years.  
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 Due to the conflict, the relationship of Tutsi and the Hutu in Burundi is rapidly 
becoming worse; the hope of reconciliation seems to be dimming. Neighboring states, 
such as Tanzania are deeply affected by the conflict and although the Tanzanian 
government committed itself to providing the Burundian refugees with homes and 
protecting them, rather than being encouraged in their efforts, the Tanzanian government 
finds itself surrounded by widespread criticism. The issue of Burundi is not only a 
humanitarian issue for the people who are directly affected by it; although indirectly, it 
negatively affects neighboring states like Tanzania. Tanzania is dealing with a full-blown 
refugee crisis, and no one is willing to acknowledge that the problem lies within Burundi. 
Tanzanian government is the one being held responsible for human rights abuses by the 
Human Rights Watch. However, Human Rights Watch representatives entirely overlook 
the fact that Tanzania’s government and the citizens are equally overwhelmed by the 
responsibility that has been bestowed on them. The conflict in Burundi is a matter of 
international security because the refugees coming from Burundi are not necessarily 
persons seeking asylum from persecution. They can just as well be the persecutors, 
making sure that the people they want to eliminate do not find safety in the borders of a 
neighboring country. Furthermore, Burundian refugees increase the instability within 
Tanzania’s borders because when there is a problem within refugee camps, they protest 
and react aggressively. Thus, states like Tanzania and its citizens are put at risk. 
 According to the UN, Burundi is an unstable state, which means that the 
environment within the borders is not one where the refugees can be repatriated to, 
because all factors are volatile—the economy, the government and the living conditions. 
Attempts to resolve the conflict and move toward a more peaceful coexistence seem to 
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only add to the already existing instability and danger to the neighboring states of the 
African region. While the issue of refugees is pressing, there is also the issue of militant 
groups that cross borders of these neighboring states thus allowing the conflict to 
transcend borders. It seems that while the world promised not to allow another Rwandan 
genocide to happen, precisely that is happening. International community and the United 
Nations failed to respond to events in Rwanda in 1994 and they are failing the African 
people again. The question lingers, who is to be held responsible? Both sides of the 
conflict have been violent towards each other and the death tolls continue rising. Neither 
the Tutsi nor the Hutu are willing to take on a clear responsibility for what has been 
going on. While the Hutu have continuously instigated violent uprisings against the Tutsi 
government, the security forces have repeatedly retaliated with violence. The conflict has 
gone on for so long and so many have been and are now involved that it is no longer 
possible to go back in history to the very beginning of Burundi as a sovereign state and 
identify the “instigator” without identifying the  “wrong people”. 
 In September 2004, during the General Assembly 6th plenary meeting in New 
York, President Domitien Ndayizeye addressed the plenary and the UN by thanking them 
for their efforts in Burundi. He also proudly claimed that: 
The signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation 
Agreement for Burundi on 28 August 2000…ushered in a 
new era of calm and a gradual return to peace with the 
conclusion of ceasefire agreements with the armed political 
movements, especially since the signing on 16 November 
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2003 of a comprehensive ceasefire agreement with the main 
rebel movement. (A/59/PV.6) 
President Ndayizeye was clearly optimistic about the situation in his country at the time 
of the meeting. He felt that that Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement was just 
what the country needed to alleviate itself of the problems and obstacles that the conflict 
between the security forces and the opposition forces was creating. He promised that a 
plan was now in place to: 
protect and strengthen peace and security by integrating the 
fighters from the armed movements into the security and 
defense forces that we will need to establish our national 
army and police force, to the comfort of all. The process will 
be complemented by the disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration of ex-combatants and troops not included in the 
integration process. (A/59/PV.6) 
Furthermore, the President called on the international community, particularly the 
African states and the African Union, to unite and work together to prevent the spreading 
of armed conflict like the one that has been plaguing Burundi and other neighboring 
African states. 
 Despite the hopeful outlook that President Ndayizeye had in 2004, at the present 
time, Burundi still finds itself with the problem of internally displaced persons and 
refugees who temporarily reside in neighboring African states. Even though in the recent 
past, Tanzania has helped large numbers of Burundian refugees return home. According 
to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, last year in January, 
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renewed fighting caused thousands of civilians to find themselves without a home in 
Bujumbura Rural. The governor of the province, Ignace Ntawembarira reported that in 
Kanyosha, IDPs "[were] sleeping in schools, court buildings or in people's homes [after 
the fighting broke out]." The only aid received immediately following the incident was 
from the International Rescue Committee, and all they brought was water. Ntawembarira 
also said that “6,000 IDPs were known to be in the Bujumbura neighborhoods of Ruyaga 
in Kanyosha and that another 5,000 were in Vugizo, a town on the outskirts east of 
Bujumbura.” (BURUNDI: Year in Brief) 
 Following the above presented evidence, the Republic of Burundi, to this day, 
finds itself struggling with armed conflict within its borders. In order to analyze the issue 
in depth not only does the history of the conflict needs to be investigated, but also the 
following must be addressed: the reaction of the international community, the reaction of 
the United Nations, the reaction of the Human Rights organization and the amount of aid 
that Burundi has received. In 2004, President Ndayizeye was filled with hope after the 
signing of the Arusha Agreements claiming that this document will help restore the peace 
in Burundi and that the state was on its way to peaceful development. However, nearly 
two years after his enthusiastic speech in the General Assembly, reports of fighting, 
displaced persons, growing numbers of refugees and continued hostility keep showing 
up.  
 While the governments of the world silently watch the events in Burundi unravel, 
human rights organizations are voicing their opinion loud and clear. Alison des Forges, 
senior Africa adviser at Human Rights Watch, stated, “In their drive to defeat the FNL, 
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government soldiers, police and intelligence agents use tactics that violate both 
Burundian and international law” (Human Rights Watch). Human Rights Watch reports:  
In the Burundian capital Bujumbura, the recent killing of a 
16-year-old who was seen in the hands of intelligence 
agents and police shortly before he was shot to death. 
Official accounts that he was shot while trying to escape do 
not concur with evidence that he was shot in the face and 
chest (Burundi: Donors Must Press for End to Continuing 
Abuses).    
In a report titled Warning Signs: Continuing Abuses in Burundi, released February 27, 
2006, the Human Rights Watch examines the recent developments in Burundi. The report 
addresses and presents a list of continuous human rights abuses: killings by the FNL, 
executions by government forces, torture by the Documentation Nationale and the police, 
random arrests and collective punishment. The Human Rights Watch report advises that 
donor nations “need to go beyond merely pledging funds if they hope to see real 
improvements in the country” (2).   
In the recent past, the international community focused on the Great Lakes 
Region. Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan declared: 
 In countries emerging from conflict like Burundi, 
reconstruction and development efforts are as vital as 
actions taken to re-establish and maintain peace and must 
therefore be addressed with the same attention and urgency 
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on the part of the international community (UN News 
Centre).  
The situation in Burundi is a great concern for human rights groups because the refugee 
situation presents a “wide array of displacement issues.” (Cohen and Deng, 17) The 
problem that the Great Lakes Region is dealing with is not limited to refugees, there is 
also a large number of internally displaced persons. They are within the borders of their 
home country, yet they have no home and no means to support themselves. The matter at 
hand is also complicated by the fact that not all internally displaced persons are in dire 
need. As Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng assert, “thousands of uprooted Burundians 
no longer have access to land for farming, while thousands of other displaced Burundians 
are still able to engage in agriculture. Thousands of displaced Burundians who need relief 
assistance do not receive it regularly, while large numbers of uprooted  Burundians who 
probably need little or no relief have attracted significant amounts of it.” (17)  
However, besides the internal conflict, one must be aware of other factors that 
created the problem of internal displacement. According to Cohen and Deng, living with 
violence for so many years Burundians have learned to run not only when danger is clear 
and present but also when it is expected. (32) They further argue, that in the beginning 
displacement was only a result of violence, but increasingly, displacement “has become a 
deliberate goal of the violence” (32). One of the most pressing issues underlying the 
crisis of internally displaced persons is that there is not even an estimate of the number of 
people who are internally displaced. The government of Burundi, and even the United 
Nations cannot resolve the problem of  internally displaced persons when the numbers 
and identities of the internally displaced persons are unknown. Further, there is no one to 
 11 
ask such responsibility of because if we are to lay the responsibility of keeping track of 
displaced persons on the Burundian government, there arises an objection that Burundian 
government could not have kept track of internally displaced persons because it was 
dealing with an armed conflict and a genocide. The United Nations, theoretically, also 
cannot be held responsible because the United Nations can only step in to keep the peace. 
As was the excuse with Rwanda, “there was no peace to keep.” Cohen and Deng further 
stress, that it was the violence of 1972 in Burundi that “profoundly changed Burundi.” 
(34) A large number of the Hutu fled the country, and as a result, Tutsi occupied the 
lands left behind by the Hutu and their businesses. This displacement “became 
permanent, and the nation’s economy suffered.” (34) 
In the crisis of internal displacement another crucial factor must be highlighted—
the matter of humanitarian aid. In 1994, Rwandan Hutu refugees came to Burundi to seek 
asylum, unfortunately, their presence “exacerbated local tensions” because, as Cohen and 
Deng explain, Burundian Tutsi believed that Rwandan Hutu were responsible for the 
1994 massacre of Tutsi in Rwanda. (46) The tensions were intensified not by the 
presence of Rwandan refugees in Burundi but because with their presence, the food aid 
would have to be given to them as well, and at this point in time, there was already a 
widespread belief that humanitarian aid was not distributed evenly. The Tutsi groups 
were convinced that the Hutu population benefited more from the humanitarian aid. 
In 2004, Human Rights First came out with a summary report of the conference 
held in Kampala, Uganda regarding protection of refugees in the Great Lakes Region. 
Part of the report offers possible “durable solutions” and emphasizes that repatriation is 
advised only if refugees are returning to a stable and safe environment. The report also 
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mentions that in Burundi many returning refugees found themselves in “a new round of 
exile” due to lack of stability and lack of available land (13). To prevent “irregular or 
secondary movement of refugees,” the report suggests approaching repatriation 
operations “on the basis of national caseloads” (14). Furthermore, in the repatriation 
operations, it is vital that a refugee leaves the host country voluntarily. In the case that a 
refugee does not wish to return, the report urges the need to “develop accurate 
registration procedures” (14). Finally, the Human Rights First summary report warns, that 
“if  procedures for the identification of continuing needs  for  protection [are] not 
thoroughly addressed concerns about the motivation for reluctance to return could poison 
local support for the establishment of long term refuge” (14).  
While Human Rights First proposes a reliable system of repatriation, at the 
present time for countries like Tanzania and for refugees themselves, it is not a practical 
solution. Tanzania hosts over 400,000 refugees, and the largest population of refugees is 
from Burundi. Tanzania has been completely overwhelmed by and not equipped for 
dealing with such large flow of refugees into its borders. However, acknowledging that 
danger is still present in Burundi and that Burundi still does not offer a stable 
environment to those willing to come back, Tanzania cannot, and does not turn away 
people seeking asylum nor close its borders.  
In the realm of international law, the Burundian conflict and those involved have 
sidestepped numerous legal boundaries and continue to do so. The Human Rights Watch 
Report emphasizes: 
International law prohibits state forces and rebel groups from 
committing willful killing, torture and other ill-treatment of 
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civilians and captured combatants, among other abuses. The 
government of Burundi is also bound by international human 
rights law, which prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, 
torture and other mistreatment, and prosecutions that do not 
meet international fair trial standards (2) 
In January of this year, the Security Council discussed the issue of conflict in the Great 
Lakes region and the result was Resolution 1653 which calls on the governments of the 
states suffering from internal conflict “to disarm and demobilize militias and armed 
groups” (Resolution 1653). While Security Council resolutions are the only documents of 
the United Nations that do have legal power, we know from past international incidents 
that even the Security Council resolutions are often not obeyed by certain members of the 
international community. 
 From an academic point of view, Peter Uvin addresses the argument of ethnicity 
and power in Burundi and Rwanda; in his piece, Uvin suggests that colonization deeply 
affected and changed the nature of the Burundian government. As a result, “Political, 
social, and even economic relations became more rigid, unequal, and biased against the 
Hutu, while the power of many people of Tutsi origin greatly increased” (255). Uvin’s 
analysis of the Burundian history of conflict leads to the conclusion that, “violence 
tended to occur at key points of political change, when the interests of the elites were 
threatened, but it has also always involved massive popular participation” (263).  Peter 
Uvin addresses the most recent incidents of violence in Burundi and points out that they 
are “the direct result of processes of democratization set in motion in large part by the 
pressure from the international community” (267). Militant groups and others involved 
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clearly have no interest in democracy. While the militant groups see democracy as 
unnecessary for Burundi, because they want to continue their violent activity, others see 
it as something evil because it comes from the very people who have continuously turned 
away from Burundi. Seeing that the result of attempted democratization has been nothing 
other than bloodshed, “the international community showed a total unwillingness to 
defend the processes it had set in motion” (267). Uvin presents an argument familiar to 
the international law and international relations students; the international community 
expected to see immediate resolution of the conflict and quiet willingness for consensus. 
However, because Burundi did not present a direct interest to the most powerful member 
states, the violent reaction to the democratization was used as a justification that the 
conflict in Burundi was hopeless. This ploy is unoriginal because, the international 
community tends to lack response when there is a dire need to help an African country 
that has been dealing with internal conflict for many years. Of course, it is easier to throw 
up your hands helplessly and claim that nothing can be done with “these savages”, rather 
than roll up your sleeves and get to action. Wars and genocides are not stopped overnight 
and the international community has seen enough precedents to acknowledge the 
complexity of the situation in Burundi. The conflict in Burundi is critical and can no 
longer be denied and ignored; if the leaders of the international community do not put 
their heads together and help Burundi fight for a peaceful future, this will affect the rest 
of the world even more than it already has. Furthermore, as Sylvestre Barancira, a 
Burundian psychologist said, “If nothing is done to put a stop to the crisis, Burundi will 
know many social misfits and risks being transformed into a nation of savages and 
madmen.” (Janzen and Janzen, 202) 
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 Leonce Ndikumana argues in his piece Towards a Solution to Violence in 
Burundi: A Case for Political and Economic Liberalization, that “the conflict in Burundi 
is the outcome of institutional failure that has perpetuated economic and political 
inequality across ethnic groups and regions” and further states that “a solution to the 
crisis must resolve around political and economic liberalization” (432). He further offers 
that in order to progress in the process to stability, Burundi needs to establish institutional 
mechanisms that would prevent future violence. (432) Furthermore, the new political 
regime must be “owned by the citizens from all economic, ethnic, and regional 
backgrounds” thus assuring a completely equal system where there is no one group that 
has more power in any way, shape, or form. (432) Originally, the one party system in 
Burundi was promoted as a way to unify the groups involved in the conflict, “but in fact 
the party became an instrument of ethnic exclusion” (437).  In closing his argument, 
Ndikumana asserts that if the conflict in Burundi is identified in terms of political and 
economic issues there are several viable solutions that would accelerate the progress to 
stability: “eradicating the tradition of using the state for oppression and accumulation; 
achieving egalitarian government; and protecting the rights of all citizens” (Abstract). 
While this proposition appears possible, in reality it is not viable due to its ambiguity. 
Ndikumana fails to explain who exactly would be responsible for beginning this process 
and, essentially, enforcing it. The Tutsis are using their power within the security forces 
to control the citizens and prevent them from protesting against the injustice and the 
abuses by the government. Therefore, there is no one left to “protect the rights of all 
citizens” unless it is someone who is neutral to the conflict. However, here is the 
obstacle; the organization that is supposed to be neutral, and was established precisely for 
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a situation like the one in Burundi is watching silently while the death toll rises and the 
refugee and internally displaced population increases to astronomical numbers. 
 Tony Waters reviewed several books and publications that address the Tutsi-Hutu 
conflict in Burundi, as well as the neighboring countries. Waters presents Renè 
Lemarchand’s idea that the Tutsi-Hutu conflict is a “social construct” (344). Waters 
further argues that if the Tutsi-Hutu conflict is a “fixed social identity,” the fact that 
similar “ethnic divisions exist in neighboring countries, particularly Tanzania” is ignored. 
(344) Waters points out that “most analyses of the presumed differences between Hutu 
and Tutsi start with the nation-state and not the ethnic categories in sub-titles” (345). He 
further claims that “if the assumption of the nation-state is taken away, the divide 
between Hutu and Tutsi can at the same time be presented as trivial, as the basis for 
nationalistic ideologies, as a pastoral lifestyle” (345). Essentially, Tony Waters concludes 
that the Hutu and Tutsi do not “inherently” hate each other, in fact, he points out that the 
only cases of “ethnocide” of Hutu and Tutsi occurred in Burundi and Rwanda, not 
anywhere else. Because Rwanda and Burundi are the only examples, analysis of the 
relationship between Hutu and Tutsi is alone not sufficient to get to the core of the issue. 
Therefore, claims Waters, it is the “political nature of the nation-state” that needs to be 
analyzed. He suggests that in analyzing the Burundian conflict, if ethnicity is completely 
ruled out as the cause for the conflict, it will be easier to get to the root of the problem. 
“The current strategy of placing Hutu and Tutsi in separate refugee camps is likely to 
perpetuate the separatist ethnic ideologies of their respective activists in the long run,” 
emphasizes Waters. Judging from Waters’s analysis, he sees the government and the 
colonial system as the “instigators” of the conflict between the Hutu and the Tutsi. 
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 While Waters presents a compelling argument, saying that focus must be directed 
at the nation-state and not the ethnic conflict, his argument is ambiguous. When looking 
at the history of Burundi as a nation-state what historical options are available? Burundi 
before colonization—a strong and thriving kingdom;  Burundi of 1962, that just received 
its independence from Belgium and is working on building a government,  and Burundi 
after 1965, as we know it now, submerged in perpetual conflict. After Burundi received 
its independence, the prime minister was assassinated, and it has been in conflict ever 
since. Therefore, analysis of the nation-state is not sufficient. Furthermore, Waters’ 
analysis above clearly shows that ethnicity is not the root of the conflict either. 
 It is no longer effective or practical to look back in time to find the “perpetrator” 
or the root cause of the conflict in Burundi. As Kofi Annan said, we must look to the 
future for solution because we are leaving this planet to our children. As sad as it may be, 
events of the past, are just that, the past. We cannot change the past and we cannot erase 
it. We must look to the past to learn from our mistakes and to correct ourselves to better 
our situation in the present. However, the solutions lie in the future, not in the past 
because it is blatantly clear that the way the international community has acted towards 
internal crises in the past, was to say the least, ineffective. An effective solution, above 
all must involve member states who have absolutely no way to benefit by helping 
Burundi. Their involvement must be for the sole reason of their passionate wish to see 
Burundi as a stable country in every sense of that word. The only way, the Burundi 
conflict will be resolved is if the states “helping” are not there to promote democracy, and 
are not there to promote any other kind of their interests. The solution will come from the 
states that have nothing to gain from being involved.  
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